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Dec. 1944] BOLLINGER V. NATIONAL Fum INS. CO. 399 
[So F. No. 16780. In Bank. Dec. 6, 1944.] 
FRED M. BALLINGER, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., 
Appellant, v. NATIONAlJ FIRE INSURANCE COM-
P .A..~y OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent. . 
[1] Dismissal-Effect of NonsuihAs Bar to Subsequent Action.-
A nonsuit does not prevent another action from being brought 
or maintained, and, if pleaded in bar, is not res judicata on 
the merits or on any issue other than that of the nonsuit itself. 
[2] Insurance-Time to Sue.-An action to recover for loss under 
a fire policy was not premature, although filed prior to expira-
tion of the time stated in the policy when the loss would be 
payable, where the defendant had unconditionally denied lia-
bility, as in such case it would serve no purpose to require 
plaintiff to delay suit further. . 
[3] Id.-Time to Sue.-An .unconditional denial of liability by the 
insurer after the insured has incurred loss and made claim 
under .the policy gives rise to an immediate right of action. 
[4] Id. - Contrachlnterpreta.tion-Against Forfeitures. - When 
claims on an insurance policy are honestly made, care should 
be taken to prevent technical forfeitures such as would ensue 
from an unreasonable enforcement of a rule of procedure 
unrelated to the merits. 
[6] Id.-Pleading-AnSwer or Plea.-Iti an action to recover for 
loss under a nre policy, even if the action has been premature, 
defendant lost the privilege to urge this defense by failing to 
plead it plainly and to assert it promptly. 
[6] Id.-Pleading-Answer or Plea-Prematurity. - In an action 
to recover for loss under a fire policy, the language of defend-
ant's answer "that neither the whole of said loss nor any part 
thereof was or is due, owing or payable to plaintiff ..• or to 
anyone at the time of the commencement of this action, at 
the present time or at any other time, or at all," was insuffi-
cient to raise the issue of prematurity, there being nothing 
in the quoted language to put plaintiff on notice of anything 
other than 8 general denial of liability under the policy. 
McK.Dig. References: [1] Dismissal, § 78; [2, 3] Insurance, 
§ 239; [4] Insurance, § 61; [5, 6] Insurance, § 257; [7] Continu-
ance, § 10; [8] InsUrance, § 240(2); [9] Insurance, § 240; [10] 
Insurance, § 240(1); [11] Limitation of Actions, §§ 99, 102, 132; 
[12] Limitation of Actions, § 109; [13] I..im!tation of AotioDB, 
HQ, 82; [14] lnAraDee, 133. 
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[7] Continuance-Grounds-Party Not Prepared.-WLile courts 
are indulgent in granting continuances to litigants to allow 
them a reasonable time to prepare for a trial on the merits, 
they must also guard against imposition and unrcasonnh)(l. 
delays. 
[8] Insurance-Limitation of Actiolls-By Policy Provision-Cir-
cumstances Excusing Compliance.-Jn an action to recover for 
loss under a fire policy, defendant could not successfully rely 
on plaintiff's failure to sue within the short limitation period 
inserted in the policy where under the circumstances it would 
be unjust to prevent a trial on the merits, as where a prior 
action had been promptly filed by plaintiff long before the 
limitation period expired, and defendant's motion for a non-
suit in that action should not have been granted. 
[9] Id.-LimitatioD of Actions-By Special Statutory Provision.-
The rule of remedial statutes permitting the institution of a 
new action after an aetion has been defeated by some techni-
cality unrelated to the merits, has particular force when the 
Legislature has shortened the limitation period. While Code 
Civ. Proc., § 355, which is the California counterpart of such 
statutes, protects a plaintiff who has mistaken his remedy if 
he was awarded a judgment in the 1irst instance and defeated 
on appeal, the basic policy underlying said section calls for 
relief in a caSe where the plaintiff, suing on a fire insurance 
policy, has not mistaken his remedy but through error of the 
trial court was not allowed to proceed to trial. 
[10] ld.-Limitation of Actions-By Policy Provision. - Where 
plaintiff brought and diligently pursued an action on a fire 
insurance policy within the limitation period prescribed 
therein, but defendant obtained numerous continuances and 
extensions of time thereby delaying the time of trial until 
after expiration of said period, plaintiff should not be de-
prived of a trial on the merits in a new action involving the 
same parties, facts and cause of action, which was promptly 
filed after entry of judgment of the nonsuit, because he failed 
to seck other remedies in the trial oourt. 
[11] Limitation of Actions-Operation and E1fect: SUSpensiOD of 
Statute-Absence from State-Disability.-Statutes of limi-
tations are not as ri~,'id as they are sometimes regarded. Under 
[8] Limitation of time within which to sue insurers, Dote, 82 
A.L.R. 748. Statutes relating to contractual time limitation pro-
visions of insurance poliCies, note, 112 A.L.R. 1288. See, also, 14 
Oal.Jur. 599 j 29 Am.Jur. 1043. 
[9] Limitation prescribed by insurance statute, Dotes, 23 A.L.B. 
97, 106-109; 149 A.L.& 483, 491-492. . 
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certain circumstances property rights or immunities may be 
acquired as a result of the running of the statutory period, 
but the period will be extended or tolled by the occurrence of 
certain events, which may be the subject of conflicting evi-
dence, such as absence from the state or disability. 
[12] ld.-Suspension of Statute-Causes not Mentioned in Statute. 
-The running of the statute of limitations may be suspended 
by causes not mentioneil in tlle statute itself. 
[13] ld.-Commencement of Period-Fraud and Mistake.---Frlwd-
ulent concealment by a defendant of the facts on which a 
canse of action is based, or mistake as to the facts constituting 
the cause of'action, will prevent the running of the period of 
limitation until discovery. 
[14] Insurance-Appeal-Determination of Cause.-On plaintiff's 
appeal in an action to recover for loss uneler a fire policy, 
equitable considerations authorized the Supreme Court to grant 
relief to the plaintiff, whether defendant insurer violated a 
legal duty in failing to disclose its intention to set up a tech-
nicaJ defense, or whetllCT it merely sought the aid of a court 
in sustaining a plea that would enable it to obtain an uncon-
scionable advantage and enforce a forfeiture. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra 
Costa County. A. F. Bray, ~udge. Reversed with directions. 
Action on fire insurance policy. Judgment for defendant 
after sustaining of demurrer to complaint without leave to 
amend, reversed with directions. 
Fred M. Bollinger, in pro. per., Jack J. Miller and Kenneth 
M. Johnson for· Appellant. 
Long & Levit and Bert W. Levit for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, as trustee in bankruptcy, brought 
this action to recover on a policy of fire insurance issued to 
the bankrupt, Kwan Tow. The policy follows the standard 
form prescrihed by the Insurance Code, sections 2070 and 
2071. It requires the insured to give the insurer written no-
tice of loss without unneceS!;lary delay: to separate the dam-
aged property from that which is unoamagec1 and put it in 
the best possible order: to make an inventory statinf! the quan-
tity ano eo!'rt of e.aen item. lind thl:' amollnt claimed thp.reon; 
[13] See 16 Oa1.J'ur. 505; 34 Am.Jur.l29. 
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to submit detailed preliminary proof within sixty days after 
the fire; to submit -the amount of loss to arbitration if the 
insurer does not assent to the amount claimed within twenty 
days after receipt thereof -or if an agreement is not otherwise 
reached. The policy also provides that "A loss hereunder 
shall be payable in thirty days after the amount thereof has 
been ascertained either by agreement or by appraisement ... " 
and that "No suit or action on this policy for the recovery 
of any claim shall be sustained, until after full compliance 
by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless 
begun within fifteen months next after the commencement 
of the fire." 
The -complaint incorporates the policy by reference and 
alleges that plaintiff was appointed trustee of the bankrupt's 
estate on September 20, 1939; that on September 27, 1939, 
the property insured was partially destroyed by fire; that on 
November 18, 1939. plaintiff and the insured submitted proof 
of loss to defendant as required by the policy; that plaintiff 
and the insured have performed all the conditions set forth 
in the policy; that on December 22, 1939, plaintiff and de-
fendant's _ agent entered into an agreement fixing the amount 
of loss at $1,160.25: that defendant denied all liability under 
the policy on the grounds that at the time of the fire the in-
sured was not the sole and unconditional owner of the insured 
personal property, that at the time of the destruction of the 
property there was a change in "the interest in, title to, or 
possession of the subject of insurance," and that under the 
terms of the policy such a change has made the policy void. 
The complaint alleges further that on January 15. 1940. 
shortly after the plaintiff was advised that the defendant 
denied alI liability under the policy, he brought suit in the 
Superior Court of San .Joaquin County to recover on the 
policy and on defendant's motion the action was transferred 
to the Municipal Court of the City and Count~· of San Fran-
cisco: that defendant requested and obt.ained from plaintiff 
and the court numerous cont.inuances and extenslons of time 
thereby deJa~1ng the time of trial until .Tanllary8, 1941: that 
after plaintiff presented hiR evidence, defendant moved for a 
nonsuit upon the ground that the action had been prematurely 
filed because t.hirty days had not elapsed from the time of 
agreement l1Pon t11(' amOl1nt of loss: thAt the motion was 
granted and judgment upon the nonsuit entered February 21, 
... J 
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1941; that on February 25, 1941, plaintiff filed the present 
action in the Superior Court of Contra Costa County alleging 
that plaintiff learned for the first time on January 8, 1941, 
the time of trial of the first action, that defendant. was rely-
ing upon the defense that the action was premature and that 
had he known earlier he would have dismh-;sed that action and 
filed a new one within the time permitted by the policy; that 
this defense was not set up or disclosed in defendant's demur-
rer or answer in that action and· that by reason of 'this fact 
and the numerous continuances and extensions of time ob-
tained, defendant waived the requirement that suit be com-
menced fifteen months from the time of the fire. Defendant 
demurred, claiming that the action was barred because it 
was commenced more than fifteen months after the fire. The 
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend 
and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. 
This appeal is not from the judgment of nonsuit given in 
the municipal court, nor is the purpoae of this appeal or this 
decision to attack that judgment conaterally, for its effect as 
res judicata on the issue of nonsuit is conceded. [1] A 
nonsuit, however, does not prevent another action from being 
brought or maintained, and if pleaded in bar is not res judi-
cata on the merits or on any other issue than that of the non-
suit itself. (Gates v. McLe~n, 70 Cal. 42 [11 P. 489] ; Slocum 
v. New ·York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 [33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L. 
Ed. 879].) Plaintiff doe..c; not contend that the municipal court 
did not have jurisdiction to try the case or that the nonsuit 
is not binding on him but admits its validity and urges this 
court to declare that its scope and evidentiary value against 
him does not bar his present attempt to secure a hearing on 
the merits. The action in which this appeal is taken is essen-
tially the same as that in which the nonsuit wa,s granted, for 
the parties, facts, and cause of action are identical, and but -
for the granting of defendant's motion for nonsuit this action 
would not have arisen. The proceedings in the municipal 
court cannot be ignored in reviewing the factual background 
of this action. They are indeed the very facts and only facts 
on which defendant's demurrer must stand or fall. From the 
statement of facts in the complaint, which were not denied, 
and which, for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer, are 
therefore to be taken as true, it clearly appeaJ'R that defend-
aut's motion for nonsuit should have been denied. 
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[2] The action was not premature. Plaintiff, from the 
time he succeeded to the rights of the bankrupt under the 
policy of insurance upon which this action is founded to the 
time of this appeal, faithfully performed all conditionR re-
quired of the insured by the terms of the policy. If defendant 
had not denied liability the loss would have been payable 
under the terms of the policy thirty days after the parties 
had agreed upon the amount thereof. Defendant, however. 
uneonditionally denied liability, leaving plaintiff no . alterna-
tive but to sue to enforce the elaim of the bankrupt. The pe-
riod of thirty days is allowed an insurance company so that 
it will have time to investigate to determine its course of ac-
tion in response to a claim against it. It may exercise the 
option given it in the policy to "repair. rebuild or replace" 
the damaged building or machinery "within a reasonable 
time" on giving notice of its intention to do 80; it may deeide 
to pay the loss agreed upon; or it may detel"IIline that it has 
a valid defense to the claim of liability. If an insurance com-
pany unconditionally denies lie hility it would serve no pur-
pose to require the in.c;ured to delay <;nit further. AB the court 
declared in Paez v. ltfutual Indern. etc. Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App. 
654, 660 [3 P.2d 69]. "The obviouR purpose of the provision 
inhibiting the institution of an action within the sixty-day 
period is to permit the eompany to make an investigation of 
the circumstances surrounding the loss, but if the company 
makes an outright denial of· liability there can be no excuse 
for delay in commencing an aetion for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the company'!'! claim of nonliability is well 
taken. It would be an idle act to insist upon compliance with 
the requirement for delay in bringing an action which the 
law 'neither doe..c; nor requires.' (Civ. Code, sec. 3532; Far-
num v. Phoenix Ins. Co. r83 Cal. 263 (23 P. 869. 17 Am.St. 
Rep. 233) 1 supra.)" [3J The rule is therefore settled in 
this court, as in the feoeral and most state courts, that an un-
conditional denial of liability by the inlnlrer after the insured 
has incurred 10RR ann manE' claim nnder the policy gives rise 
to an immediate right of at'tion. (Paez v. Mut)Utl Indem. etc. 
Ins. Co., supra: Wmiams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 54 C81 442. 
448 f35 Am.Rep. 771: f'arroll v. Girard F. Ins. Co., 72 Cal. 
297. 299 f13 P. 8631: ~f'/,11.ard v. Legion of HOMr, 81 Cal. 
340. 349 r22 P. R641: Pnrnll'nt v. Phoenix InsuranCl! Co .. 83 
Cal. 246, 263 [23 P. 869, 17 Am.St.Rep. 233]; McCoUO'Ugh T. 
.. 
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Home Ins. Co., 155 Cal. 659, 663 [102 P. 814, 18 Ann. Cas. 
862]; Wilkinson v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 180 Cal. 252, 258 
[180 P. 607]; Grant v. Sun Indemnity Co., 11 Ca1.2d 438, 440 
[80 P.2d 996] ; Lee v. United States Fire Ins. 00., 55 Cal.App. 
391, 395-96 [203 P. 774]; 1i'rancis v. /otoa Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 
112 Cal.App. 565. 573-74 [297 P. 122]; Hill v. Mutual Benefit 
Health etc. Assn .. 136 Cal. App. 508. 512 r29 P.2d 285]; 1i'ohl 
v. Metropolitan lAfe In.~. 00 .• 54 Cal.App.2d 368, 383 [129 
P.2d 24] ; Trousdell v. Equitable Life Assur .. Soc., 55 Cal. 
App.2d 74, 84 r130 P.2d 173]: see 7 Couch on Insurance 
(1930), § 1656b. pp. 5755-56 and Cum.Supp. p. 83, citing cases 
in support of the genera) rule from the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Canada. and twenty-eight state courts: 5 Joyce, 
Insurance, (2d ed.), § 3211: Ch'. Code. § 1440: cf. dictum in 
Genuser v. Ocean Accident e.tc. Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 979. 983 
[135 P.2d 6701.) The desirability of the rule ill apparent, 
for if a waiting period were necessary notwithstanding the 
election of the insurer to denv liabilitv. it would become a 
trap for the unwary. and would encour~ge dilatory tactics as 
in the present case. Inl!in v. Tnsurance Co. of North America, 
16 Ca1.App. 143 r116 P. 2941 and Borger v. Connecticut 
Fire Ins. Co., 29 CaJ.App. 476 f1!)fi P. 701 aTe therefol'e 
disapproved. 
The insurance policy incorporated by reference in the com-
plaint is of the usual complexity. While courts are diligent 
to protect insurance companie!': from fraudulent claimR and 
to enforce all l'eguJationl' necellRary t.o their protection. it 
must not be forrmtten that t.he primary funC'tion of insurance 
is to insure. [4J When claims are honeRtly made. caTe should 
be taken to prevent technical forfeiture.c:: !imch as would emme 
from ~n unreasonable enforcement of 1\ rule of procedure un-
related t.o the merit!: (Gran.t v. 81l1! Tnrlemnif11 Co .• lIupra: 
Glickman v. Nell' York TAfe Tns. Co .. 16 r.a12d 626 fl07 P.2d 
252. 13] A.L.R. 12921: ]3 Appleman. Tmrnrance Law and 
Practice (1943). ~ 73Rl). n. ~7: !;ee ~e.U' Y"rk TAfe In.~. Co. v. 
Eggleston. 96 U.R 572. 577 r24 L.F-d R411: 7{nn.'1as (!ity TAfe 
Tns. Co. v. Pat·is. (C.C.A ~n 9!'i 'F.2d 952. 957: American 
Credit Tndemnitll ('0. v. W. 'K. 1fitche.1l c.f: ('0 .. (C.C.A. 3) 
7R F.2d 276. 277-78: TJRngmaid tv"i1'l'r and E.~t()'P'Pel in Tn-
surunce Law. 20 CaUJ.Rev. 1. 40-41: 7 TT.Pit.t.L.Rev. 14R·!lO). 
[6] Defe!ldant's pORit.ion W0111if nnt he imnrovf'iI hnt1 tl,e 
action in fact been pl'emature, for defendant had lost the 
'J 
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privilege to urge thil< ucJmH,e I)~' faililll~ to pleau it lllainly 
and to assert it IJl'Ullll'tJy. Vihllu,'.y ladH·.~ are not favored 
by the law, for they waste the court's time, increase the cost 
of litigation unnecessarily, and may easily lead to abatement 
of an actioll on purely tecJmical grounds after the statute of 
limitations has run. (1 C.J.s. Abatement and, Revivai, § 193; 
Bemmerly v. Woodwaj'd, ]24 Cal. 568, 574 [57 P. 561]; Realty 
& Rebuilding Co.v. Rea, 184 ,Cal. 565 [194 P. 1024J; Seches 
v. Bard, 215 Cal. 79 [8 P.2d 835); California 7'horn Cordag,e., 
Inc. v. Diller, 121 Cal.App, 542 f9 P.2d 594].) Defendant's 
plea of prematurity, was a dilatory plea in abatement, unre-
lated to the merits and not asserted for nearly a year after 
plaintiff's action was filed. Under these circumstances de-
fendant loses its privilege to raise it. 
[6] Defendant contends. howe\,er, that the defense was 
properly' pleaded by the following language in its answer: 
"that neither the whole of said loss nor any part thereof was 
or is due, owing or payable to plaintiff or to Kwari Tow or to 
anyone at the time of the commencement of this action, at the 
present time or at any other time, or at all .•.. " It cites 
cases holding that such a denial is sufficient to raise the issue 
of prematurity. None of the cases cited, however, involved Ii 
delay so long that the policy limitation period expired or the 
failure promptly to assert the defense. There is nothing in 
the language quoted to put plaintiff on notice of anything 
other than a general denial of liability under the policy. De-
fendant'lS requests for additional time did not indicate any 
intent to rely on premature filing, for extensions of time for 
trial are, not necessary to raise the defense of prematurity. 
['1] While courts are indulgent in granting continuances to 
litigants to allow them a reasonable time to prepare for a trial 
on the merits. they must also guard against imposition and 
unreasonable delays. (Estate of Bollinger, 145 Cal. 751, 753 
[79 P. 427]; Light v. Richardson, 3 Cal.Unrep. 745, 746-47 
[31 P. 1123]; see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 594a, 595, 596.) Not 
only was there nearly a year's delay in the present case but 
the nonsuit prevented a trial on the merits. 
[8] Under the circumstances it would be a perversion of 
the policy of the statute of limitation to deny a trial on the 
merits. AB the Supreme Court of the United States declared 
in Orurl' of R. Te7rrJrarhers v. Rm71l'all E.-rp. Age7l,c11 (1944). 
321 U.S. 342, 348 [64 S.Ot. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788], "Stat-
\ ) 
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utes of limitation •.• in their conclusive effects are designed 
to promote justice by preventing surprises through the re-
viviLl of claims that ha\;e been allowed to-slumber until evi· 
dence has ueen lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim 
it is unjust not to put an adversary on notice to defend within 
the periodqf limitation and the right to be free of stale claims 
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. 
Here, while the litigation shows no evidence of reckless haste 
on the part of either party, it cannot be said that the claims 
were not timely pursued." (See; also, 190 Law Times 303-05.) 
The short statutory limitation period in the present case is 
the result of long insistence by insurance companies that they 
have additional protection against fraudulent proofs, which 
they could not meet if claims could be sued upon within four 
years as in the case of actions on other written instruments 
[Code Civ. Proc., § 337). Originally the shortened limitation 
periods were inserted into policies by insurers. Some courts 
declared such provisions void as against public policy while 
other courts enforced them in order to protect freedom of 
contract. (See cases collected, 41 Yale L.J. 1069.75.) In reo 
fusing to permit a _ short limitation period to defeat a claim 
that had been brought in good time and diligently pursued, 
the court in Genuser v. Ocean Accident etc. Corp., 57 Cal. 
App.2d 979, 986 [135 P.2d 670], declared "We assume that 
the limitations of time within which suit may be brought which 
are commonly found in insurance policies are placed there in 
good faith and to serve a wholly proper and meritorious pur· 
pose. We do not doubt that experience has demonstrated the 
wisdom of providing by contracts of insurance shorter periods 
for the institution of actions than those provided by law, but 
the purpose of such limitations is to obtain the advantage of 
an early trial of the matters in dispute and to make more 
certain and convenient the production of evidence upon which 
the rights of the parties may depend" but "it is clear to us 
that defendant's conduct furnished the occasion for the delay 
and that it cannot take advantage of a situation which was 
of its own creation." Under the circumstances of the present 
case it would be manifestly unjust for this court to prevent 
a trial on the merits, which the law favors (Bern v. Rogero, 
168 Cal. 736, 741 [145 P. 95]; Waybright v. Anderson, 200 
Cal. 374, 377 [253 P. 148]; 13 CalL.Bev. 363), thereby m-
405 BoLLINGER v. NATIONAL FIRE INS. CO. [250.2d 
curr- =- t technical forfeiture of the insured's rights, which the 
law L=..::::r;:.rr.ges (Grant v. Sun 111dunnity Co., supra; Glick-
ma't .,.. Jt,-cv.' York Life Ins. Co., supra; see 7 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 
14~ :':"" €T~:forcing the fifteen-month limitation period when 
the ;':-.i~.~ Htion waR filed promptly and long before the 
per:'-.: r~:red. 
(9: TD€ htatutes of most states provide that when an ac-
tio::. " :1::·::·;:;,ght in good time and diligently pursued, but de-
fea:e<: r;' some technicality unrela1ed to the merits, a new 
aet:':r: :lIl£7 be brought within a eertain period, usually six 
mot:.~ ~ £ year, which shall be deemed a continuance of the 
fon::..e If.!::.:ion. These statutes ha.e their origin in section 4 
of tft~ T;n!."':ish Limitation Act of 1623.- (Wood v. Carpenter, 
101 L~ 135. 139 [25 L.Ed. 807]; Gaines v. Oity of New York, 
215 ~ "! 533. 537 [109 N.E. 594, Ann. Cas. 1916A 259, L.R.A. 
1917(: !!DB:.) Although there is a eonflict in the cases where 
the T:m:i:.a':ion period is contractual. in the several jurisdic-
tio~. ~t lHchigan, that have adopted a standard form of 
policy by statute, as California has, it has been 
held, ~ these or other remedial statutes designed to prevent 
teclmie::t' iorleitures under statutes of limitation also apply 
to the- linrl:tntion period ineorporated by statute into every 
ins~ poliey. (See eases collected in 23 A.L.R. 97, 106-
109: ~! AL.R. 483, 491-492.) The reason for such a rule 
has '9'~..i~ force when the Legislature has shortened the 
li.nL.~ period frorp. four years, eontrolling actions on other 
wri~ :ins:roments (Code Oiv. Proc .• § 337), to fifteen months 
on ti:r'!: .l:nsI::rance policies (Ins. COO",\ § 2071), since the prob-
abili_. n: "technical forfeiture is 2,3 the greater. The Cali-
fornia ~erpart of such statutes i.; section 355 of the Code 
of Cbr'i ~dure, copied from sect jon 84 of the New York 
Code rr ~edure, which in turn -was based on section 4 of 
the F,"T .. ~_ Limitation Act of 1623. (Gaines v. City of New 
-x:: .Jt:. a::: o! the said actions or aurA, judgment be given for the 
p~ zz:::: the IIIlme be reversed by er.:-or, or a verdict· pass for the 
p~ ..: upon matter alleged in arrefIt of judgment, the judgment 
be g: .... _~ the plaintiff, that he tal:.e nothing by his plaint, writ 
or bilL ~ r any of the l18id actions be brought by original, and the 
defl!!l:lila::r-~ be outlawed, and ahati &fter reverse the outlawry; 
that ;;n. .:. mci:. eases the party plaintiff, ilis heirs, executors or admin-
i~ -= ~ case shall require, may ecmtmence a new action or suit, 
from ~ r nme, within a year after IItll!'r. judgm~nt reversed,or such 
giTea a M tile plainti1f, or outlawr,y aweri8d, and not after." (11 
.1 ... ~ ~ :If., .. ~) 
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York, supra.) Simplified by the elimination of references to 
particular English forms of practice, section 355 provides: 
"If an action is commcllced within the time prescribed there-
for, and a judgment therein for the plaintiff be reversed on 
appeaJ, the plaintiff, or if hc die and the canse of action sur-
vive, his representatives, may commence a llew action within 
one year after the reversa1." If construed literally as apply-
ing only in the event of reversals on appeaJ, section 355 would 
not give the protection that the English statute afforded to a 
plaintiff who had unsuccessfully pursued his right in a pre-
vious suit. Even the English statute, however, had to. be sup-
plemented by judicial construction and applied beyond its 
literal language to accomplish its purpose. "One may per-
haps venture to say that the judges took rather a liberty with 
the statute, but I presume the origin of the doctrine is to be 
found in the hardship inflicted in particular cases on the liti-
gant or his estate through no fault of his own by a rigid ad-
herence to the terms of s. 4." (Lopes, L.J. in Swindell v. 
Bulkeley, 18 Q.B. 250; Hayward v. Kinsey, 12 Mod. 568, 88 
Eng.Rep. 1526; Hodsen v. Harridge, 2 Wms.Saund. 64, 85 
Eng.Rep. 693; Curlewis v. Mornington, 7 El.&BI. 285, 119 
Eng.Rep. 1252; see Gaines v. City of New York, 8'Upra, at 
p. 537.) 
The New York Court of Appeals in the Gaines ease, speak-
ing through Judge Cardozo, held that statutes that have their 
roots in the English statute should be construed with similar 
liberality: "We think that whatever verbal differences exist, 
the purpose and scope of the present statute are identical in 
substance with its prototype, the English Act of 1623.. • • 
The statute is designed to insure to the diligent suitor the 
right to a hearing in court till he reache.s a judgment on the 
merits. Its broad and liberal purpose is not to be frittered 
away by any narrow construction. The important considera-
tion is that by invoking judicial aid, a litigant gives timely 
notice to his adversary of a present purpose to maintain his 
rights before the courts." Although the Gaines ease involved 
the section of the New York Code of Procedure that succeeded 
section 84 of that code from which section 355 of the Califor-
nia Code of Civil· Procedure was taken, the doctrine of con-
struction set forth therein did not rest on the wording of 
the new section but on the basic policy of the statute. The 
wording of section 355 is reminiscent of the old English stat-
utes that specified situations instead of formulating general 
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rules. As presently worded it protects a plaintiff who has 
mistaken his remedy if he was awarded a judgment in the 
first instancc and defeatcd on appeal. There is all the more 
reason to protcct a plaintiff, as ill the preSC!lt case, who has 
not mistaken his remedy but through error of the trial cour't 
was not allowed to proceed to trial. The basic policy that un-
derlies section 355 calls for relief in such a case. (See 
Code Civ. Proc., § 4.) 
In any event this court is not powerless to formulate rules 
of procedure where justice demands it. Indeed; it has shown 
itself ready to adapt rules of procedure to serve the ends of 
justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably pre-
vent a trial on the merits. (Wennerholm v. Stanford Univer-
sity School of Medicine, 20 Ca1.2d 713 [128 P.2d 522, Hl 
A.L.R. 1358]; Ch"istin v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 526 [71 
P.2d 205, 112 A.L.R.1l53]; Tuller v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 
352 [10 P.2d 43] ; see 31 Ca1.L.Rev. 225, 227; see, also, Rogers 
v. Dukart, 97 Cal. 500, 504 [32 P. 570]; California Constitu-
tion, art. VI, § 4lh; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 355, 356, 473, 475; 
Civ. Code, §§ 3523, 3528.) The Wennerholm case, supra, is 
typical. The Legislature enacted section 472(c) of the Code 
of Civil Procedure to do away with the unduly technical rule 
that required plaintiff to request leave to amend, even though 
the trial court had already sustained a demurrer without 
leave to amend, before he could seek appellate review of the 
trial court's order. Although the action was pending at the 
time of the enactment, the court refused to follow the cases 
that had established the technical requirement, thus adopting 
the rule in 472(c) before it became law. It was also held 
that where amendment is sought after the statute of limita-
tions has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as 
of the date of the original complaint so long as recovery is 
sought upon the same general set of facts (see, also, cases col-
lected in 16 CaLJur., § 143, pp. 547-548), recognizing that 
despite the new filing, the action is still the same. [10] In 
the present ease plaintiff brought his action on the policy in 
good time and diligently pursued it. The nonsuit was errone-
ous and unrelated to the merits. But for the unreasonable 
delay in bringing the action to trial, the limitation period 
would not have expired and ample time would have remained 
to file a new action. Since this action is in reality a continu-
ance of the earlier action involving the same parties, facts, 
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and cause of action, and was promptly filed after entry of 
judgment on the nonsuit, plaintiff should not be deprived of a 
trial on the merits be(~ause he failed to seek other remedie:::: in 
the municipal court. [11] Statutes of limitations are not so 
rigid as they are sometimes regarded. Under certain circum-
stnnces property rights or immunities may be acquired as a 
result of the running of the statutory period, but the period 
will be extended or tolled by the occurrence of certain events, 
which may be the subject of conflicting evidence, such as 
absence from tIle state or disability. (Code Civ. Proc., § 351 
et seq.) [12] It is established that the running of the stat-
ute of limitations ma~r he suspended by causes not mentioned 
in the statute itself. (Bl"aun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wan. (77 U.S.) 
218, 223 [1!l hEd. 895J; Collins v. Woodworth, 109 F.2d 
628, 629.) [18J It is settled in this state that fraudulent 
concealment by the defendant of the facts upon which a cause 
of action is based (Kimba.ll v. Pacific Gas db Elec. Co., 220 
Cal. 203 r30 P.2d 39J) or mistake as to the facts constituting 
the cause of action (Davi.<r etc. Co. v. Advance etc. Works, 
Inc., 38 Ca1.App.2d 270 r100 P.2d 1067J; see 16 Cal..1ur. 505) 
will prevent the nmning- of the period until discovery. 
[14J Principles of equity and justice, which moved this 
court in the Kimhnl ease, supra. to grant relief are likewise 
controlling here. Th(>re is no need to make fine distinctions as 
to the person:::: who owe a dnt.~· to disclose. The Kimball case 
invoh'ed an emplo~'er ",ho::::(> fiduciary obligations to his em-
plo~rees were nn('('ltain. The nresent ea.se involves an insurer 
",hos(> dut.\, of gooe'! fRith in dealing with the insured is well 
established. (See]~ Appleman. Insurance Law and Practice 
37; Vance. In::::uran('(> f1 !l30) 74.) It i:::: likewi::::e unnecessary 
t.o dwell upon the contention t.hat the insurer's duty of good 
faith to ito; insured arises at the time of contractin~ and per-
sists throughout the period when premiums are paid and no 
return is ROllght. hut that- when 8 loss occurs and the insured 
Reeks to obtain th(> ('ompensation pro'\Tided in the contract. 
t.he parties oeal at arm's leng-th. It is sufficient to hold that 
the equitahle eon!':ideration:::: that justify relief in this case 
are applicable whether defendant violated a legal duty in 
failing to di::::close its intention to set up this technical defense, 
or whether it is now merely seeking the aid of a court in sus-
taining a plea that would enable it to obtain an unconscion-
able advantage and enforce a forfeiture. 
./ 
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The judgment is re\'cl'scd with ilircctions to the trial court 
to overrule the dcmurrcr. 
GiLson, C. J., ShCllh, J., and Cartcr, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Disscnting.-I concur in 
the juugment outreach my conclusion upon a different ground 
and dissent from certain propositions declared in the major-
ity opinion as hereinafter indicated. That opinion, in effect, 
reviews the judgment which was rendered in the municipal 
court in the preceding action. I agree with the majority state-
ment by Mr. Justice Traynor that, upon the facts as pleaded 
here, it appear~ that in the municipal court action "defend. 
ant's motion for nonsuit should have been denied." But con· 
cluding that the municipal court erred at that time in. that 
action is hnmaterial on this appeal. The fact remains that 
the municipal court did grant the motion, did determine that 
such action was prematurely brought, and did enter judgment 
of dismissal. We have no power, on this appeal from the 
judgment of another court in another action, to vacate the 
judgment in the previous action in the municipal court. We 
cannot revive that action in the guise of sustaining this one. 
The only materiality of that one here concerns not what should 
have been done but what was done. . 
As a secondary basis for its conclusion Justice Traynor's 
opinion declares, "Defendant's position would not be improved 
had the action [in the municipal court) in fact been prema-
ture, for defendant had lost the privl1ege to urge this defense 
by failing to plead it plainly and to assert it promptly . •.• 
Defendant's plea of prematurity was a dilatory plea in abate-
ment, unrelated to merit..~ and not asserted for nearly a year 
after plaintiff's action was filed. Under these circumstances 
defendant loses its privl1ege to raise it." (Italics added.) 
1 do not know whether Justice Traynor intends to imply that 
the trial court in such a situation loses jurisdiction to enter-
tain a special dilatory plea or merely errs in sustaining it. 
If he means the former it seems to be a rather drastic inno-
vation of law to promulgate without precedent, and if he 
means the latter. then, obviously, his attack on the municipal 
court judgment is collateral. Assuming that that court abused 
its discretion in entertaining the dilatory plea when it was so 
tardily raiscd. neverthI:'1t'R!'I. that court, not thiR one, possessed 
the jurisdiction to, and did, pass on the plea. The oclion '" 
) 
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the mU1Hcipal coud, erroneously or otherwise, was ended by 
the judgment of dismissal. The new action, in which this 
appca.l is taken, was not commenced until the complaint in it 
was filed. (Coue Civ. Proc., §§ 350 and 405.) That date is 
l<'euruary 25, 1941, anu it is with that date we must reckon 
in detenninil1g whether the action is barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
In seeking to avoid the bar of the statute here Justice Tray-
nor goes on to declare that "The statuteS of most states pro-
vide that when an action is brought in good time and dili-
gently pursued, but defeated by some technicality unrelated 
to the merits, a new action may be brought within a certain 
period, usually six months or a year, which shall be deemed 
a continuance of the former action .• •• In any event, this 
court is not powerless to formulate rules of procedure where 
justice demands it .••• Since this action is in reality a con-
tinuance of the earlier action involving the same parties, fact.. . 
and causes of action, and was promptly filed after entry of 
judgment on the nonsuit, plaintiff should not be deprived of 
a trial on the merits because he failed to seek other remedies 
in the Municipal Court." (ItalicS added.) While legisla-
tion such as that which Justice Traynor says "The statutes of 
most states provide" would seem desirable under the circum-
stances of the case before us, the fact remains that in Cali-
fornia the statutes do not so provide. I do not feel at liberty 
to concur in supplying the lacking legislation. Statutes of 
limitation are more than "rule.c:: of procedure." In addition 
, to the fact that the prescribing of limitation periods, otherwise 
than, by contract, is essentiall~T a legislative function, it iR 
the law that parties acquire vested rights through the opera-
tion of statutes (or contracts) of limitation when the pre-
scribed period has completely run and even the Legislature 
cannot retroactivel~' enlarge a period which has expired. (See 
Peiser v. G1-iffi,n (1899),125 Cal. 9,14 [57 P. 690]; Chambers 
v. Gallagher (1918), 177 Cal. 704, 708-709 [171 P. 931].) 
Hence we have no right to innov,ate the amendment decreed 
by the majority opinion and give it retroactive effect. 
But there is a sound basis upon pre-existing statutes for 
reaching the conclusion that the present action is not barred. 
The Legislature has fixed four years (Code Civ. Proc., § 337] 
as bt'ing- onlinarily the l·easonable period within which an 
action founded upon an instrument in writing shall be 
) 
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brought, but by the provisions. of sections 2070 and 2071 of 
the Insurance Code has prescribed "fifteen months next after 
the commencement of the fire" 8S the period within which an 
actfon for the recovery of a claim upon a fire insurance policy 
must be instituted. This special limitation is required to be 
set forth in every policy and, by reason of such statute, it is 
to be deemed included in e\'ery policy, regardless of whether 
it is actually written therein. (Sec Brown v. Ferdon (1936), 
5 Ca1.2d 226, 230 [54 P.2d 712]; Hates v. Snowden (1937) 
19 Ca1.App.2d 366, 369 [65 P.2d 847]; MueUer v. Elba Oil 
Co. (1942), 21 Ca1.2d 188. 204 [130 P.2d 961]; Fernelius v. 
Pierce (1943), 22 Ca1.2d 226. 243 [138 P.2d121; Baugh v. 
Rogers (1944), 24 Ca1.2d 200. 215 [148 P.2d 633].) It de-
rives its effectiveness from the statute. The same statute also 
prescribes certain requirements as to notification, proof, as-
certainment of loss, and lapse of time, which· must be met 
before an action can be "sustained." It specifically provides 
that "No suit or action ..• for the recovery of any claim 
shall be sustained, untt'l after full compliance by the insured 
with all of the foregoing requirements, nor unless begun 
within fifteen months next after the commencement of the 
fire." (Italics added.) 
The meaning of the word "sustained," and the effect of 
the clause in which it appears, might be open to argument if 
the defendant here had not already committed itself to its 
understanding of a definite meaning for that word and the 
clause, and enforced that meaning on the plaintiff. This sec-
tion, on its face, would seem open to the meaning that an ac-
tion on the policy could be commenced at any time "within 
fifteen months next after the commencement of the fire" but 
that it could not be "sustained." as by a judgment for plain-
tiff, until the lapse of the required time, etc. But the mean-
ing attributed to the clause by defendant, and adopted by the 
municipal court in granting defendant's motion for nonsuit, 
is not merely that an action assertedly prematurely brought 
can be abated during the incompetent period and until the 
specified requirements have been met, but is, rather, that such 
an action must be dismissed. In other words. the position of 
the defendant, as invoked in the preceding action, and held 
by the court in a judgInent which has become final, is that the 
provision in question amounts t{l a .~t(/t1ttory prohibition stay-
ing the commencement of the action. Defendant cannot be 
/ 
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permitted to invoke the benefits of a statutory prohibition 
against the commencement of an action on the policy without 
also bearing the burden of such statutory prohibition. Sec-
tion' 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a genera] law of 
the state, applicable under the circunlstances shown. It pro-
vides that "'Vhen the commencement of an action is stayed 
by • ~ • statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of 
the . • • prohibition is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action." Excluding the time during 
which, on defendant's theory, plaintiff was prohibited from 
commencing the action, his second complaint was filed in time. 
For the reasons above stated I concur in the judgment of . 
reversal. 
EDMONDS, J.-Bome months ago, upon an opinion writ-
ten by Mr. Justice Traynor, this court affirmed the judg. 
ment in favor of the insurer. (Bollinger v. National Fire 
Ins. Co., -(Cal.) 147 P.2d 611.) I concurred in the decision 
and nothing was developed upon the rehearing to change my 
views that the applicable law was then correctly applied to 
the unControverted facts. The present discussion of my as-
sociate omits all reference to the principal contentions of the 
parties and places the decision upon a ground correctly 
designated by Mr. Justice Schauer all judicial legislation. I 
assert with confidence that the rule of procedure which is 
now promulgated as justification for reversing the judgment 
has no sound legal basis, and I adhere to the principles 
which were stated and applied in the former opinion. 
In California. all' fire insurance must be written upon a 
standard form of policy which. in part, provides: "No suit 
or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be 
sustained, until after full compliance by the insured with all 
of the foregoing requirements. nor unless begun within fifo 
teen months next after the commencement of the fire." (Ins. 
Code. § 2071.) The fire which occasioned the damage for 
which the appellant demands reimbursement occurred about 
eighteen months before this action was filed. Relying upon 
the provision of the statutory policy. the insurer demurred 
upon the ground that the action waR begun subsequent to the 
expiration of the period of limitation. The trial court sus-
tained the demurrer wit.hout leAve to amend, and entered 
/ 
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judgment for the insurer. The issue, consequently, concerns . i 
the propriety of that ruling. 
The language of the policy, the. appellant asserts, must· be 
interpreted as permitting an insured to commence an action 
within fifteen months from the time the cause of action ac-
crues, which, he declares, is the date "it was first possible to 
file a suit under the policy" after the amount of ]oss has been 
ascertained. The courts of a small minority of states have 
80 construed policy provisions such 9.~ the one required by . 
our statute. (Ellis v. Council Bl11.JJs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa 507 
[20 N.W. 782]; German Ins. Co. v. Fai)'bank, 32 Neb. 750 
[49 N.W. 711, 29 Arn.st.Rep. 459]; Sample v. London etc. F. 
1m. Co., 46 S.C. 491 [24 S.E. 334, 57 Arn.St.Rep. 701, 47 
L.R.A. 696]; Boston lIlarine Ins. Co. v. Scales, 101 Tenn. 628 
[49 S.W. 743] j Hong Sling v. Royal Ins. Co., 8 Utah 135 [30 
P. 307]; McFarland &- Steele v. Peabody Ins. Co., 6 W.Va. 
425.) The great weight of authority, however, holds that the 
clear terms of such a limitation will be enforced and, accord-
ingly, a policy providing that no action will be sustained "un-
less begun within fifteen months next after commencement of 
the fire" simply fixes a period beyond which the insured may 
not sue. (Provident Fund Soc. v. Howell, 110 Ala. 508 [18 
So. 311] j Daly v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 16 Colo.App. 349 
[65 P. 416]; Chichester v. New Hampshire Fire 1m. Co., 74 
Conn. 510 [51 A. 545]; Gt.'braltar Fire &- Marine 1m. Co. v. 
IAnier, 64 Ga.App. 269 [13 S.W.2d 27]; Maxwell Br08. v. 
Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 12 Ga.App. 127 [76 S.E. 1036]; Mc-
Daniel v. Gerntan-American Ins. Co., 134 Ga. 189 [67 S.E. 
668]; Williams v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 98 Ga. 532 [25 S.E. 31]; 
Trichelle v. Sherntan &- Ellis Inc., 259 TIl.App. 346; Western 
Coal etc. Co. v. Traders Ins. Co., 122 TIl.App. 138; Colonial 
Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Ellinger, 112 Ill.App. 302; Oakland Home 
1m. Co. v. Allen, 1 Kan.App. 108 [40 P. 928]; State Ins. Co. 
of Des Moines v. Stoffels, 48 Kan. 205 [29 P. 479]; Smith v. 
Herd, 110 Ky. 56 [60 S.W. 841, 1121] j Owen v. Howard 1m. 
Co., 87 Ky. 571 [10 S.W. 119]; Guccione v. New Jersey Inl. 
Co. (La.App.) 167 So. 845; Tracy v. Queen City P. Ins. Co., 
132 La. 610 [61 So. 687, Ann.Cas.1914D 1145]; Blanks v. Hi-
bernia Ins. Co., 36 La.Ann. 599; Carraway TI. Merchants Mut. 
1m. Co., 26 La.Ann. 298; Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid Soc., 68 
Md. 465 [12 A. 884, 6 Am.St.R.ep. 460]; Metropolitan Life 
; , ... Co. v. Dernpsell, 72 lid. 288 [19 A. 642]; FvZlGm v. N_ 
) 
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York Union Ins. Co., 7 Ura.)' (1tlas;.) 61 l6G Am.Dec. 462]; 
Little v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 123 Mass. 380 [25 Am.Rep. 96J i 
Dahrooge v. Rochester-German Ins. Co., 177 Mich. 442 l143 
N.W. 608, 48 L.R.A.N.S.906ji Shackett v. People's Mut. Ben. 
Soc., 107 Mich. 65 [64 N.W. 8751; Peck v. German F. Ins. Co., 
102 Mich. 52 [60 N.W. 453]; Rottier v. German Ins. Co., 84 
Minn. 116 [86 RW. 888]; Willoughby v. St. Paul German 
Ins. Co., 68 Minn. 373 [71 N.W. 272]; Grigsby v. German 
Ins. Co., 40 Mo.App. 276; Bradley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 
App. 7; Glass v. Walker, 66 Mo. 32; Ignazio v. Fire Assn. of 
Phila., 98 N;J.L. 602 [121 A. 456]; Electric Gin Co. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 39 N.M. 73 [39 P.2d 1024]; Biloz v. 
Tioga etc. Assn., 21 N.Y.S.2d 643 [affd. 23 N.Y.S.2d 460]; 
Hammon v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 327 [50 N.E. 863, 42 
L.R.A. 485]; King v. Watertown F. Ins. Co. 47 Hun. 
(N.Y.) 1; Rouse v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 203 N.C. 345 [166 
S.E. 177]; Welch v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 192 N.C. 809 [136_ 
S.E. 117]; John Tatham ct Co. v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 181 
N.C. 434 [107 S.E. 450]; Travelers' 1m. Co. v. California 
Ins. Co., 1 N.D. 151 [45 N.W. 703, 8 L.R.A. 769]; Appel v. 
Cooper Ins. Co., 76 Ohio 52 [80 N.E. 955, 10 Ann. Cas. 821, 
10 L.R.A.N.S. 674]; Lucas v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia (Ohio 
App.), 42 N.E.2d 674; United States P. Ins. Co. v. Swyden 
175 Okla. 475 [53 P.2d 284]; Camden F. Ins. Assn. v. Walker, 
111 Okla. 35 [238 P.462]; Wever v. Pioneer F. Ins. Co., 49 
Okla. 546 [153 P. 1146]; Egan v.Oakland Home Ins. Co., 29 
Ore. 403 [42 P. 990,54 Am.St.Rep. 798]; Miners Savings Bank 
v. Merchants F.Ins. Co., 131 Pa.Super, 21 [198 A. 495]; How-
ard Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 130 Pa. 170 [18 A. 614]; Schroeder 
v. Keystone Ins. Co. (Penn.), 2 Phila. 286; Braunstein v. 
North River Ins. Co., 62 S.D. 561 [255 N.W. 463]; Kroeger 
v. Farmers'Mut. Ins. Co., 52 S.D. 433 [218 N.W. 17]; Schlitz 
v. Lowell Mut. P. Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 334 [119 A. 516]; Morrell 
ct Co. v. New England P. Ins. Co., 71 Vt. 281 [44 A. 358]; 
Virginia F. ct M. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736 [3 S.E. 349]; 
Virginia F. ct M. Ins. Co. v. Aiken, 82 Va. 424; Hefner v. 
Great Am,er. Ins. Co~, 126 Wash. 390 [218 P. 206]; State 
Ins. Co. v. Meesman, 2 Wash. 459 [27 P. 77, 26 Am.St.Rep. 
870]; Har' v. Citizens Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 77 [56 N.W. 332, 39 
Am.St.Rep. 877, 21 L.R.A. 743]; McFarland v. Railway etc. 
Accidfmt ..4.ssn., 5 Wyo. 1~~ [38 P. 347, 677, 63 Am.St.Rep. 
29, 27 A.L.R. 48].) 
The decisions in California follow this rule and hold tAM an 
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insured must begin his action within fifteen months from the 
date of loss. (Tebbets v. Fidelity If Casualty Co.; ]55 Cal. 
137 [99 P. 501]; Garido v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 
Unrep.560 [8 P. 512); Harlow v. American Eq1litab7e Assur . 
. Co.,87 Cal.App. 28 [261 r. 490]; Fitzpatrick v. North Amen-
con Ace. Ins. Co., 18 Cal.App. 264 [123 P. 209].) The appel-
lant insists, however, that in Case v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 
473 [23 P. 534, 8 L.R.A: 48), the court followed the minority 
role. But in tllat case the insurer exacted compliance with 
policy provisions which required thirteen months to complete 
although the contract restricted the commencement of an 
action to "within twelve months next after the fire shall 
occur." Under those circumstances the limitation was held 
unenforceable. A similar situation was shown in Bennett v. 
Modern Woodmen, 52 Ca1.App. 581 [i99 P. 343], because 
giving lite!'al effect to the insurer's by-laws, the remedy of 
the beneficiary was suspended until the organization rejected 
her claim although the period of limitation was then running. 
Otherwise stated, the by-laws which the insurer there relied 
upon gave it the opportunity to delay action until the period 
of limitation had expired. 
In the present case, less than nhiety days after the :fire the 
appellant and the insurance company agreed upon the amount 
of the loss whicll, by the terms of the statutory policy, was 
payable thirty days thereafter. The present action was com-
menced about eighteen months after the date· of the :fire and 
thirteen months after the loss was payable. Moreover, had 
the insurance company exacted full compliance with every 
provision of the policy, the amount of the loss would have 
become payable not more than five months after the :fire, and 
the limitation of fifteen months for the commencement of an 
action gave the insured ten months in which to sue. In other 
words, by the tcrlDS of the policy contract, the time for bring-
ing an action could not have been reduced to less than ten 
months. and because in the present case the amount of the loss 
was promptly agreed upon, the insured had thirteen months 
within which to pursue his remedy.. . 
Certainly this situation is entirely different from that shown 
in either Case v. Sun 1m. Co., supra, or Bennett v. Modern 
Woodmen, supra, and it affords no justification for applying 
\he doctrine relied upon by a few courts for the purpose of 
~ from policy provisions whieh unduly shortened the 
) 
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period of limitation by !Joliey covenants. (See 41 Yale hJ. 
lOG!>.) In n numher of states the IJegislatul'e has adopted 
a statute either prohibitillg ~\Jly limitation by contract or 
providing for a sj.ecifie(l time aft('r accrual of the C[!llse of 
action for the (,OlIlJ:1Cllecmellt of the' nction. But ill jnrisdic-
tions having no st::tll!()J'Y proldbitiol1 ng-ainst policy limita-
tions, the rnle is tlwt altllOl1;!,'h pal'ties to 'n contract may ag-ree 
upon a limitation pClioa less than that pro\'i<1c(l by statute 
generally, a reasonable time must be allowed for the com-
mencement of an action. (Tebllets v. Ficlelity d'; Casua7ty Co., 
supra; Fitzpatrick v. North American Ace. Ins. Co., slIpra; 
Harlow v. American Equitable A.sS1tr. 00., supra: Beeson Y. 
Schloss, 183 Cal. 618 [J92 P. 292]; Pageol T. &- O. Co. v. 
Pacific Indemnity Co., 18 Ca1.2d 748 [117 P.2d 669].) Ac-
cording to the doctrine of these cases. the form of policy re-
quired by the Insurance Code of this state (§ 2071) unques-
tionably provides for a reasonable period within which to sue. 
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor, it is implicitly ad-
mitted that, under ordinary circumstances, an action must be 
commenced within fifteen months after the date of the fire, 
and that the limitation is not unreasonable. There is the fur-
ther implication that the insurer is not estopped, nor did it 
waive the right to assert that the present action is barred. 
However, the opinion avoids the consequence of the principles 
formerly deemed controlling by formulating a rule of proce-
dure heretofore unknown in this state, to the effect that when 
an action is brought in good time and diligently pursued, but 
defeated by some technicality unrelated to the merits, a new 
action may be commenced within a reasonable time, which 
shall be deemed a continuance of the former action. The as-
serted basis for such relief is that the legislative enactments 
of several states so provide, and the justification for its adop-
tion by this court is said to be that in the present case the end 
to be achieved justifies the means. Judicial decision should 
not rest upon that doctrine. 
Admittedly the appellant finds himself in unfortunate cir-
cumstances. But those circumstances were of his own choos-
ing and his plight is no different from that of a multitude of 
litigants against whom this court has applied clear rules of 
law. And contrary to the intimation. raised by dictum in the 
majority opinion, the appellant's position was not occasioned 
by any unreasonable conduct of the insurer. Although it is 
said that the situation of the plaintiff at the present time 
) 
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is attributable to the improper ruling of the trial court in 
the 'original action granting the insurer's motion for a non-
suit, the record sho;'vs no allegation nor ,claim by him that 
the company obtained extensions of time for the designed 
purpose of causing the period of limitations to expire, that 
the continuances were improper or not for good causc, or that 
the insurer affirmatively misled him by lulling him into a 
sense of false security. 
On the contrary, it. appears that the appellant, an attorney 
at law, consented to the continuances granted the company. 
He is charged with notice of the provisions of his policy 
(Madsen v. Ma1'yland Casualty Co., 168 Cal. 204 [142 P. 51] ; 
Rice v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 21 Cal.App.2d 
660 [70 P.2d 51(j]) and the state of the law governing his suit. 
Implicit in the present holding of Mr. Justice Traynor, how-
ever, is the assumption that in some unspecified manner the 
insurer took unfair advantage of the appellant and, conse-
quently, justice demands that this court create a remedy. The 
so-called "factual background of this action," warrants no 
such assumption; on thc contrary, controlling principles com-
pel the conclusion that according to settled rules of law the 
insurer took no undue advantage of Bollinger. He and the 
insurance company were adversaries in an action at law and 
as such entitled to dcal at arm's length. The company was 
under no duty to warn Bollinger that his action would be for-
feited if he did not commence a proper action within the time 
limited by the policy (Fleishbeinv. Western Auto S. Agency, 
19 Cal.App.2d 424 [65 P.2d 928]; W~'lhelmi v. Des Moines 
Ins. Co., 103 Iowa 532 [72 N.W. 685]; Howard Ins. Co. v. 
Hocking, 130 Pa.St. 170 [18 A. 614]; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. 
California Ins. Co., supra) nor to warn him that it intended 
to rely on strict enforcement of the policy provisions. The 
rule that the insurer and the insured owe each other a high 
degree of good faith in contracting (Vance on Insurance (2d 
ed., 1930), pp. 74-75) does not in any sense affect their posi-
tion as adversaries in a court of law for, in litigation, they 
face each other in an entirely different capacity having en-
tirely different incidents. 
Unquestionably Bollinger chose to follow a course by which, 
according to the former rule of decision in this state, he lost 
his right of action. I concur in the conclusions of Mr. Justiee 
Schauer that the ruling in the first suit brought by Bollinger 
--) 
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is immaterial to the present litigation and that this court 
should not couutenance a collateral attack upon the former 
judgment of nonsuit. But if it is to be considered, as statcd 
by 1\1r. Justice Traynor the determination was incorrect, be-
CtiUSe "an unconditional denial of liability by the insurer 
after the insured has incurred loss and made claim under tIle 
policy gives rise to an immediate cause of action." Bollingcr 
therefore had an effective remedy by appeal which he did not 
invoke. Instead of doing so he commenced the present action, 
alleging that by its conduct the insurer waived the right to 
rely upon the provisions of the policy, and the court now 
devises an extraordinary remedy to relieve a litigant who in· 
stead of taking an appeal from an erroneous judgment, sued in 
another ·court upon the same claim. 
The rule now applied is said to be one of procedure, but it 
determbes the substantive rights of the parties and, in addi-
tion, operates retroactivel:" to interfere with vested rights 
acquired by virtue of the term of the policy contract and th!' 
Insurance Code. And if the remedy is a part of the common 
law, it certainly directly conflicts ", .. ith constitutional anu 
statutory provisions. To me. the question for decision is 
readily determinable by fundamental principles which have 
long been recognized and applied. Accordingly, and even 
more particularly for t.he reasons well stated by Mr. Justice 
Traynor upon the prm-ious decision of t.his case, I am of the 
opinion that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Curtis, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
4, 1945. Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a 
rehearina-
